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EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES
AND GOVERNMENT PROMOTION
OF SECURITIZATION
DOUGLAS ARNER*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Securitization in its broadest meaning refers to the process of
transforming traditional forms of bilateral, illiquid financial relation-
ship (e.g., loans) into freely tradable market instruments (i.e., securi-
ties).  In this broad meaning, securitization has been a key trend in fi-
nancial markets over the past thirty years, as finance has moved away
from traditional bank lending to the capital markets.1  More fre-
quently, however, securitization is used to refer to a specific form of
financial transaction in which assets (typically loans or other receiv-
ables of some sort, but possibly any future stream of revenue) are
packaged together and used to collateralize or “back” an issuer or an
issue of securities.  This process may be effected under varying struc-
tures, but most commonly through the issue of bonds by a separate
special purpose vehicle (SPV).  This type of transaction is more ap-
propriately referred to as asset securitization.  In the developed fi-
nancial markets of the United States and the United Kingdom, asset
securitization serves a number of different purposes: (1) supporting
public policy objectives such as broad home ownership and the devel-
opment of financial markets (especially capital and mortgage mar-
kets);2 (2) addressing regulatory requirements for financial institu-
tions, especially capital adequacy and lending limit requirements
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1. See generally ROY C. SMITH & INGO WALTER, GLOBAL BANKING (1997) (describing
international capital market structures, operations, and trends).
2. DAVID BARBOUR ET AL., ASSET SECURITIZATION IN EMERGING MARKET
ECONOMIES: FUNDAMENTAL CONSIDERATIONS 8–11 (London Institute of Int’l Banking, Fin.
& Dev. L., Essays in Int’l Fin. & Econ. L. No. 13, 1998).
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applicable to banks;3 (3) transferring risk, especially in the context of
non-performing assets and portfolio diversification;4 and (4) providing
finance.5  The usefulness of these sorts of financial structures in a va-
riety of contexts has prompted countries and market participants
from around the world to seek to develop similar structures in their
own markets.6  The most successful examples have been in continen-
tal Europe.7  These efforts, however, need to be placed in the appro-
priate context: asset securitization is a sophisticated capital market-
based financial structure that rests on a complex matrix of supporting
elements, all of which have a significant legal element.  The lesson:
traditional asset securitization structures cannot simply be “para-
chuted” into individual financial systems (especially those of emerg-
ing market economies with a civil law tradition) and expected to ful-
fill the sorts of functions for which they are so useful in the United
States and the United Kingdom.  Nonetheless, undertaking an asset
securitization transaction in any given jurisdiction serves as a useful
“stress test” of the limits in that specific jurisdiction, especially in re-
spect to legal impediments.
The requisite elements necessary for asset securitization transac-
tions can be derived from analysis of the most common form of asset
securitization, the securitization of mortgages.8  At the most basic
3. According to the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, banks that securitize assets
are able to accomplish several objectives: “1) reduce regulatory capital requirements; 2) obtain
an additional source of funding, generally at lower cost; 3) enhance financial ratios; . . . 4) man-
age portfolio risk;” and 5) diversify their portfolios.  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION,
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: ASSET SECURITISATION 1 (2001), available at http://www.bis. org/
publ/bcbsca06.pdf (last visited May 5, 2002) [hereinafter BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION: ASSET SECURITISATION].
4. BARBOUR ET AL., supra note 2, at 8–11.
5. Id; see generally Steven L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994) (describing asset securitization and its benefits); Claire A. Hill, Securiti-
zation: A Low-cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH U. L.Q. 1061 (1996) (expanding on
Schwarcz’s analysis to examine the underlying basis of securitization benefits).
6. See, e.g., Claire A. Hill, Latin American Securitization: The Case of the Disappearing
Political Risk, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 293, 328–29 (1998).
7. See generally Liz Jones, European CMBS: All Talk and No Action, 16 J.I.B.L. 149
(2001) (describing the strengths of Europe’s commercial mortgage backed securitization
(CMBS) market); Giles Thieffry & Jonathan Walsh, Securitization: The New Opportunities Of-
fered by Economic and Monetary Union, 12 J. INT’L BANKING L. 463 (1997) (forecasting that
the introduction of a common currency in Europe will have a favorable effect on European se-
curities markets).
8. Mortgage securitization is chosen because of the key role real estate finance plays in
economic development (addressed in Section II).  For a discussion in the context of receivables
financing, see Steven L. Schwarcz, Towards a Centralized Perfection System for Cross-border
Receivables Financing, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 455 (1999).
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level, a mortgage securitization involves a variety of key supporting
elements: (1) a market for real estate-based finance, such as mort-
gages; (2) capital markets (e.g., markets for securities); and (3) infra-
structure to support securitization, such as the legal support for ap-
propriate SPVs.  All three elements are interrelated and encourage
financial stability and economic development, but the fundamental
premise remains that mortgage securitization (and by extension more
complex forms of asset securitization) is not possible without all three
elements.
II.  THE FIRST KEY ELEMENT: A SYSTEM OF
FINANCE BASED UPON REAL ESTATE
A. Real Estate Finance Generally
Clearly, the key underlying element necessary for securitization
of mortgages is the existence of sufficient numbers of mortgages of
predictable quality.  This entails the existence of a functioning system
of finance based upon real estate.  Significantly, recent research sup-
ports the view that such a system of finance based upon real estate is
in fact a key to financial and economic development.9
Specifically, in a 1999 World Bank study, Frank Byamugisha de-
velops a theoretical and conceptual framework to guide the empirical
analysis of the effects of real estate finance on the economy as a
whole.10  He argues that the conceptual framework linking real estate
finance to financial development and economic growth has five key
linkages: (1) the land tenure security and investment incentives link-
9. See generally HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000) (proposing that the reform of
legal systems in developing countries can help activate idle capital); DOUGLASS C. NORTH &
ROBERT P. THOMAS, THE RISE OF THE WESTERN WORLD: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY
(1973) (arguing that efficient economic organization is the key to growth); NATHAN
ROSENBERG & L. E. BIRDZELL, HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECONOMIC
TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD (1986) (arguing that Western economic devel-
opment hinged on factors promoting experimentation); Arthur A. Goldsmith, Democracy,
Property Rights and Economic Growth, 32 J. DEV. STUD. 157 (1995) (providing empirical evi-
dence that the growth of democratic freedoms and property rights in poor countries may lead to
increased local prosperity); Johan Torstensson, Property Rights and Economic Growth—An
empirical study, 47 KYKLOS 231 (1994) (applying empirical analyses of property rights and eco-
nomic growth to substantiate the earlier findings of Rosenberg and Birdzell as well as North and
Thomas).
10. FRANK BYAMUGISHA, THE EFFECTS OF LAND REGISTRATION ON FINANCIAL
DEVELOPMENT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: A THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
12 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2240, 1999).
ARNER ARTICLE_FMT.DOC 06/04/02  4:04 PM
508 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 12:505
age; (2) the land title, collateral, and credit linkage; (3) the land li-
quidity, deposit mobilization, and investment linkage; (4) the land
markets, transactions, and efficiency linkage; and (5) the labor mobil-
ity and efficiency linkage.11  All five linkages are necessary to support
effective real estate-based finance, and all five are in fact based upon
the existence of appropriate legal infrastructure.12
B. Developing Mortgage Markets
Given the significance of real estate finance for economic devel-
opment, the next issue focuses on the development of markets in
which secondary mortgage markets can have an important role.  In a
1997 World Bank study,  Dwight Jaffee and Bertrand Renaud analyze
factors that hinder the development of mortgage markets in the tran-
sition economies of central and eastern Europe and propose a strat-
egy to expedite development.13  They show that banks in transition
economies are reluctant to make mortgage loans because of the risks
in mortgage lending (i.e., credit, interest rate, and liquidity risks) and
suggest that, together with necessary improvements in the primary
market, a secondary mortgage market is likely to assist in solving
these problems.  In this respect, they conclude:
A housing finance system, however, is unlikely to spring up without
government support, whatever one’s faith in the dexterity of Adam
Smith’s invisible hand. Government support was required in the
developed economies, and it is required now in the transition
economies.  In fact, the transition economies face the additional
major hurdle that they must first create an economic and legal in-
frastructure that can support the long-term and complex market
relationships and contracts that constitute a housing financial sys-
tem.14
According to Jaffee and Renaud, the transition process focuses
on three key processes: (1) economic stabilization and liberalization;
(2) privatization; and (3) financial sector development.15  Specifically,
they conclude: “Mortgage market development is likely to be a key
11. Id. at 6–10.
12. Byamugisha graphically presents the connections between the five factors and their
role in creating a conceptual framework of land registration, financial development, and eco-
nomic growth.  Id. at 7 fig.2.
13. DWIGHT JAFFEE & BERTRAND RENAUD, STRATEGIES TO DEVELOP MORTGAGE
MARKETS IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
1697, 1996).
14. Id. at 27.
15. Id. at 1.
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factor in overall financial market development.”16  In another recent
World Bank study, Ahmed Galal and Omar Razzaz argue that land
and real estate reforms, to be successful, must be “comprehensive in
design, even if implementation is phased in over time.”17  They con-
tend that such reforms must include three elements:18 (1) institutional
reforms that better define property rights,19 reduce information
asymmetry, and improve contract performance (Property Rights, In-
formation, Contracting and Enforcement (RICE));20 (2) capital mar-
ket reforms that make mortgage finance available at reasonable rates,
especially for the poor (Finance and Risk Management);21 and (3)
market reforms that reduce or eliminate the main distortions in the
prices of goods and services produced by land and real estate assets
(Market Regulation and Fiscal Policy).22  Their conclusions clearly
link mortgage market development to broader efforts to develop real
estate finance to serve as a driving factor in financial and economic
development.
III.  THE SECOND KEY ELEMENT: DEVELOPMENT OF
CAPITAL MARKETS
A. Secondary Market in Mortgages
In respect to mortgage market development, Jaffee and Renaud
suggest that secondary mortgage markets confer two main benefits:
16. Id. at 3 (noting that mortgage debt is the largest component of the U.S. domestic debt
market).  Jaffee and Renaud further portray the relevance of mortgage market development in
the broader context of financial market development and graphically present a framework for
sustainable financial development showing that the creation of a housing finance system is an
integral part of the overall development of the financial sector.  Id. at 28 fig.4.
17. AHMED GALAL & OMAR RAZZAZ, REFORMING LAND AND REAL ESTATE MARKETS
31 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2616, 2001).
18. Id. at 31, 10–18 & tbl.2.
19. Property rights regimes include: constitutional protection of property; laws and regula-
tions defining rights and obligations to property; means of assignment of rights to property; and
institutional arrangements that register and enforce such rights.  Id. at 17.
20. Issues include well-defined property rights, protected through formal, informal or tradi-
tional institutions; permissibility of evolution and transformation of property rights; exercisabil-
ity and related transactions costs; and ability of the poor to access real estate and related fi-
nance.  Id. at 38.
21. Issues include a conducive macro environment; competitive mortgage finance markets;
adequate banking regulation and supervision; developed capital markets, including secondary
mortgage markets and institutional investors; and well-developed and reliable foreclosure and
repossession laws and procedures and appropriately designed subsidy systems.  Id.
22. Issues include appropriate land use regulations and appropriate incentive systems for
real estate, finance, services, and investment.  Id. at 38–39.
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(1) the ability of banks to shed risks associated with holding mort-
gages; and (2) the creation of standards for credit evaluation and col-
lateral procedures that directly increase the efficiency of the primary
markets for new mortgage originations.23  In order to secure these
benefits, the authors suggest an important and often catalytic role for
governments in developing secondary mortgage market (SMM) sys-
tems and institutions.  This role is based on similar experiences in de-
veloped countries, including the United States.24  To establish a sys-
tem (in the form of a mortgage credit institution (MCI) which issues
debt in the capital markets and uses its funds to purchase mortgages
from the originator-institutions), Jaffe and Renaud suggest five key
principles: (1) the primary role of the government in the secondary
mortgage market should be to guarantee the bonds issued by the
MCI, with costs defrayed through a user fee (government guarantee
of MCI debt); (2) access to the SMM should be available to all lend-
ers and borrowers who are able to offer properly underwritten mort-
gage instruments for sale (a level playing field for all lenders and bor-
rowers); (3) the government should not manage the MCI but should
maintain an appropriate supervisory role through regulations con-
cerning assets, liabilities, and capital (government regulation, but not
government management); (4) a plan should be established for priva-
tization and entry of MCIs (competition, privatization, and sunset
provisions); and (5) the government must create the legal and finan-
cial infrastructure, including property rights, foreclosure procedures,
and secured lending laws, that are the necessary first step for the de-
velopment of any meaningful mortgage market activity (public policy
in support of primary lenders).25
23. JAFFEE & RENAUD, supra note 13, at 5.
24. The authors evaluate three structures: (1) purchases by mortgage credit institutions,
such as the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) in the United States; (2) loans to
depository institutions by mortgage credit institutions, such as the Federal Home Loan Banks
(FHLBs) in the United States; and (3) mortgage securitization, through purchase and sale
through a mortgage credit institution (MCI), such as FNMA in the United States.  They con-
clude that mortgage securitization is unlikely to be relevant in the context of the transition
economies.  Id. at 17–22.  This author, however, would suggest that it is only a small step from
the first or second structure to the third and that the benefits in terms of capital market devel-
opment make securitization structures and issues very relevant in the wider context of the role
that securitization can play in financial development and stability.
25. Id. at 24–27.
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B. Functioning Domestic Bond Markets
With the stage set by the existence of a domestic mortgage mar-
ket, mortgage securitization can play an important role in promoting
the development of a second type of capital market, the domestic
bond market.  Following financial crises around the world over the
past decade, international attention has increasingly focused on de-
veloping local bond markets.  In a study published in 2000, the Inter-
national Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank analyzes
bond market development in Asia and provides some lessons to guide
future development efforts.26  At the most general level, the study
finds that a number of interactive factors make up the environment
necessary for bond market development and need to be considered
from the bottom up.  These factors include factors around the market,
factors across other parts of the financial system, and factors inside
the market.27
In this context, the study suggests that whether a primary market
can be built depends upon the existence of four key factors: (1) mar-
ket participants (inside); (2) government commitment (inside); (3)
macroeconomic stability and credibility (around); and (4) taxation
(around).28  If these are in place, four second-layer success factors in
turn become significant (all across):29 (1) government securities mar-
kets; (2) equity and money markets; (3) the banking system; and (4)
credit-rating agencies.  Secondary markets are even more difficult,
and in some cases impossible, to develop.30  Regardless, markets must
be developed in stages, the sequencing and content of which neces-
sarily depend upon the specific domestic context.31
26. BUILDING LOCAL BOND MARKETS: AN ASIAN PERSPECTIVE (Alison Harwood ed.,
2000).  The study looked at five South Asian countries: India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh,
and Nepal.
27. Alison Harwood, Building Local Bond Markets: Some Issues and Actions, in BUILDING
LOCAL BOND MARKETS, supra note 26, at 1, 6–7, 8 fig.1 (fig.1 depicts the Bond Market Envi-
ronment, showing the relationship between various factors inside, around, and across the mar-
ket to the Capital Market Infrastructure).
28. Id. at 10–13.
29. Id. at 13–15.
30. Id. at 15–16.  Nonetheless, even without an effective secondary market, the develop-
ment of debt capital markets supports diversification of finance and financial stability.
31. Id. at 25–26.
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IV.  THE THIRD KEY ELEMENT: INFRASTRUCTURE
SUPPORTING SECURITIZATION
A 1999 Asian Development Bank (ADB) report surveying secu-
ritization in eight Asian countries32 found the following overall char-
acteristics: (1) shallow domestic bond markets with the greatest li-
quidity concentrated in short-term securities; (2) weak legal
frameworks in support of securitization; and (3) large and growing
primary mortgage markets despite the Asian financial crisis.33  On the
basis of this prevailing state, the report makes thirteen recommenda-
tions to encourage the development of mortgage-backed securities
markets in the Asian region:
(1) foster macroeconomic stability;34
(2) develop legal infrastructure to support primary and secon-
dary mortgage markets;35
(3) establish secondary mortgage corporations;36
(4) use special-purpose trusts (SPTs) in economies with a domi-
nant mortgage lender (typically state-owned);37
32. The surveyed countries include the People’s Republic of China, India, Indonesia, South
Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Thailand.
33. MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES MARKETS IN ASIA 54 (Renato Reside et al. eds.,
1999).
34. “Macroeconomic stability encourages long-term investment and thus provides the basis
for building long-term capital markets, including MBSs [mortgage-backed securities] markets.
Therefore, economies should make every effort to stabilize their macro economies in the light
of the Asian financial crisis.”  Id.
35. With respect to the domestic mortgage markets, economies must have a legal and
regulatory framework conducive to building liquidity in the primary and secondary
markets for mortgages and for MBSs.  Foreclosure laws must be restructured to facili-
tate the recovery of properties, clear tax and accounting rules must govern the convey-
ance/assignment and true sale of mortgages, and transaction costs must be minimized.
Id. at 55.
36. Experience indicates that a secondary mortgage corporation (SMC), though not a
necessary condition for the introduction of MBSs, facilitates its development if there
are many competitors in the primary mortgage markets.  Therefore, while current
MBSs markets may not justify the development of an SMC, the future growth of MBS
markets may entail the establishment of one.
Id. at 56.
37. In economies where the dominant primary mortgage lender is (still) expected to be
a single institution, securitization should (in theory) be easier to develop.  This is be-
cause a single institution will have all of the relevant information for securitization
(loans, borrower histories, portfolio quality, etc.).  In this case, it may be advisable to
explore securitization through a special-purpose trust (SPT) arrangement with a bank
rather than through SMCs.
Id. at 57.
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(5) improve and standardize the mortgage underwriting proc-
ess;38
(6) create competitive domestic bond markets with appropriate
taxation;39
(7) establish a benchmark yield curve;40
(8) eliminate investment restraints;41
(9) develop appropriate technology for trading, clearing and set-
tlement;42
(10) improve disclosure and develop ratings systems;43
(11) create legal infrastructure to support credit enhancement;44
(12) reduce or eliminate interest-rate controls and subsidies;45 and
(13) enhance regulatory capacity.46
Significantly, most of these elements relate directly to legal infra-
structure, but more importantly, many also require (or at least may be
encouraged through) government promotion.
38. Economies should also strive to improve overall mortgage underwriting proce-
dures, including the quality of borrower and credit history information, to improve
borrower screening and ultimately the overall quality of mortgages. Then, they should
introduce practices such as credit scoring to help standardize the underwriting process
and facilitate the development of the MBSs market.
Id.
39. “With respect to domestic bond markets, economies must ensure that transaction costs
and taxes do not constrain liquidity in the primary and secondary financial markets.  Regulators
must also ensure that domestic bond markets are competitive, to minimize spreads and distrib-
ute market power among participants.”  Id. at 58.
40. “Because they allow longer-term debt to be priced, the establishment of long-term
benchmark yield curves also encourages bond/MBSs market development.”  Id.
41. “Constraints on eligible instruments by potential investors, such as contractual savings
institutions, inhibit the development of domestic bond markets.”  Id. at 59.
42. To reduce transaction risk in MBSs the private sector and the government may
consider investing in technology to improve overall clearing and settlement.  Estab-
lishing formal and organized over-the-counter markets for bonds and MBSs, or allow-
ing MBSs to be issued and traded in the local stock exchange, will encourage the adop-
tion of modern technology in MBSs markets, and will also improve market liquidity.
Id.
43. “Improved access to information about bond market participants fosters competition
and efficiency in financial markets, including MBSs markets.  The cultivation of a ratings culture
may therefore stimulate bond/MBSs market growth.”  Id. at 60.
44. “Aside from providing improved legal protection for creditors, countries may also con-
sider building a sufficient framework for the provision of external credit enhancements for
MBSs, such as facilitating the development of competitive private mortgage guarantee mar-
kets.”  Id. at 61.
45. “Price distortions in mortgage and bond markets, such as interest-rate controls and
subsidies, inhibit bond/MBSs market development.  They should be used only minimally or, bet-
ter yet, eliminated.”  Id.
46. “Regulators must strengthen their technical capacity to supervise and regulate MBS
transactions.”  Id. at 62.
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V.  CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
PROMOTION OF MORTGAGE SECURITIZATION
In a short space, this article has attempted to make a number of
points:
1. The promotion of asset-backed securitization, especially
mortgage-backed securitization, can have a significant impact
on financial development and stability, in turn supporting
economic development.
2. Mortgage securitization is one aspect of an overall process of
financial market development and cannot be separated from
the larger process.
3. Mortgage securitization rests on a complex matrix of legal
and institutional structures and must be addressed in this
context.
Based upon the analysis above, a number of steps may be identi-
fied to guide any government seeking to promote the development of
mortgage securitization.47  At the most basic level, the creation of a
functioning system of real estate-based finance involves a number of
issues beyond the precondition of macroeconomic stability: (1) clear
property rights to real estate; (2) clear rights to transfer property
rights (including bankruptcy and foreclosure); (3) clear rules re-
specting use of real estate as collateral; (4) financial institutions capa-
ble of undertaking credit analysis related to collateralized real estate
lending; (5) a clear and predictable system of taxation; and (6) appro-
priate financial regulation and supervision.  Regardless of whether
more complex issues are addressed, putting in place such a frame-
work most likely will enhance financial stability and economic devel-
opment.
Unfortunately, with respect to most of the issues,48 international
agreement on appropriate standards does not exist.  Philosophical dif-
47. For a discussion of government efforts to promote the development of debt capital
markets in Hong Kong through securitization, see Stefan Gannon, The Use of Securitization to
Mobilize Liquidity and in Particular the Use of Specialized Mortgage Corporations, in
INTERNATIONAL BANK INSOLVENCIES: A CENTRAL BANK PERSPECTIVE 301, 301–10 (Mario
Giovanoli & Gregor Heinrich eds., 1999).  The Hong Kong government has also promoted the
development of mortgage securitization.  Further information is available on the Hong Kong
Monetary Authority website, http://www.info.gov.hk/hkma (last visited Jan. 31, 2002), and on
the Hong Kong Mortgage Corporation website, http://www.hkmc.com.hk (last visited Jan. 31,
2002).
48. The exceptions are the factors of credit analysis and financial regulation and supervi-
sion.  International efforts have dealt with both of these issues extensively, encouraging finan-
cial stability through a complex matrix of principles, standards, and guidelines now coordinated
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ferences between legal systems and political and cultural variances
have prevented international consensus in the context of property
rights, despite their importance in economic development in a mar-
ket-based system.  Further, these barriers have discouraged interna-
tional development institutions such as the World Bank, ADB, and
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)
from pursuing reform programs in these areas.49  This issue clearly
merits more attention and research.
With the development of an appropriate legal and institutional
framework supporting real estate finance, the next level of objectives
focus on the development of domestic bond markets.  Key issues in
this respect include the establishment of a benchmark yield curve
through the issuance of government securities and the creation of the
infrastructure necessary for a market in government securities.50
Once a market for government securities has been established, the
framework can be extended to mortgage-backed securities and corpo-
rate debt.
According to the Committee on the Global Financial System
(CGFS) of the G10 central banks, following financial crises over the
past decade, “there seems to be a growing consensus that deep and
liquid financial markets, especially government securities markets,
are needed to ensure a robust and efficient financial system as a
whole.”51  The CGFS has formulated five guiding principles which in
turn are used to draw more specific policy recommendations: (1)
through the Financial Stability Forum.  Additional information regarding this arrangement is
available on the Financial Stability Forum website, http://www.fsforum.org (last visited Jan 31,
2002).
49. Perhaps because of these difficulties, these institutions have placed more focus on col-
lateral as opposed to moveables.  See generally John Simpson & Joachim Menze, Ten years of
secured transactions, LAW IN TRANSITION (European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment (EBRD), London, U.K.), Autumn 2000, at 20–26 (summarizing accomplishments of the
EBRD in secured transactions reforms for developing nations in Central and Eastern Europe);
Nuria de la Pena et al., Secured Transactions Law Reform in Asia: Unleashing the Potential of
Collateral, in 2 LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 2000, at 1
(2000) (a major study on secured transactions law reform based on findings of the Asian Devel-
opment Bank’s regional assistance studying the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan,
Thailand, and Indonesia); EMERGING FINANCIAL MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS
(Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas eds., 1999) (addressing the legal infrastructure area for
economic law reform and exploring sundry comparative dimensions for “bridging the gap” be-
tween civil law and common law secured transactions).
50. See supra notes 27, 34–46 and accompanying text.
51. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMM. ON THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, HOW
SHOULD WE DESIGN DEEP AND LIQUID MARKETS? THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
1 (1999).
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competitive market structure should be maintained; (2) markets
should have low levels of fragmentation; (3) transaction costs should
be minimized; (4) sound, robust, and safe market infrastructure
should be ensured; and (5) heterogeneity of market participants
should be encouraged.52  Based on these guiding principles, the CGFS
has established five recommendations for the creation of deep and
liquid government securities markets: (1) desirability of coherent debt
management strategies: an appropriate distribution of maturities and
issue frequency should be ensured as a means of establishing bench-
mark issues at key maturities; (2) taxation: the liquidity-impairing ef-
fect of taxes should be minimized; (3) transparency: transparency of
sovereign issuers and issue schedules should be ensured and transpar-
ency of trading information encouraged, with due attention being
paid to the anonymity of market participants; (4) trading rules and in-
frastructure: safety and standardization in trading and settlement
practices should be ensured; and (5) related markets: repo, futures,
and options markets should be developed.53  Further, according to the
CGFS, central banks have a clear role in market development and fi-
nancial stability.54
With the establishment of a benchmark yield curve, mortgage se-
curitization is the next focus in the process of capital market devel-
opment.  Issues which need to be addressed include: (1) modification
of land and collateral laws to support the transfer of mortgages; (2)
development of laws supporting use of intangibles as collateral; (3)
establishment of a government-supported mortgage institution (fo-
cusing on both insurance and purchase); (4) modification of corpora-
tion and/or trust laws to support the creation of SPVs; and (5) estab-
lishment of credit rating agencies or credit agencies.
In this context, capital adequacy rules and lending limits have
had a significant impact upon the development of securitization in-
ternationally.  Recent proposals for a new Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision Capital Accord (Basel II) provide some guid-
ance for countries seeking to put in place the requisite elements to
support securitization.55  Specifically, countries seeking to establish
52. Id. at 2–4.
53. Id. at 4–8.
54. Id. at 8.
55. See BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: THE
NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca03.pdf (last
visited Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE NEW BASEL
CAPITAL ACCORD].
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appropriate legal infrastructure to support securitization (perhaps
through a law on securitization and/or modifications to bankruptcy
and collateral laws) can look to the specific requirements necessary
for capital adequacy purposes in order to guide legal reforms.56  As
one example, under the standardized approach for originators, the
fundamental goal for capital purposes is to ensure a distinction be-
tween the bank originating assets and the securitization transaction
itself, or a “clean break” as it is termed in Basel II.57
In order to achieve a clean break for capital purposes, under the
minimum operational requirements, the bank must transfer the assets
legally or economically via a true sale (e.g., novation, assignment,
declaration of trust, or subparticipation).  A true sale is characterized
by the following elements: (1) the transfer of assets legally isolated
from the transferor (supported by a legal opinion); (2) a transferee
that is a Qualifying SPV and in which the holders of the beneficial in-
terest in that entity have the right to pledge or exchange those inter-
ests; and (3) a transferor that does not maintain effective or indirect
control over the transferred assets.58  If these requirements are not
met, then the securitization does not achieve capital relief, even if it
would otherwise be a “true sale” under home country law.59  Clearly,
government efforts must focus on the necessary legal infrastructure to
fulfill the minimum internationally acceptable operational require-
ments with respect to securitization and capital relief for banks.  In
addition, certain requirements apply to credit enhancements; for ex-
ample, such enhancement must only be provided at the outset of the
scheme and the full amount provided must be deducted from capital;
otherwise, a clean break will not be achieved.60
The Basel II proposals also provide some guidance in the context
of financial institutions investing in securitizations.61  These require-
ments in turn influence the behavior of banks considering investing in
56. Id. at 6.  Basel II identifies three fundamental elements composing the minimum capital
requirements: a definition of regulatory capital, risk-weighted assets, and the minimum ratio of
capital to risk-weighted assets.
57. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: ASSET SECURITISATION, supra note 3, at 3.
58. Id.; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD,
supra note 55, at 87.
59. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: ASSET SECURITISATION, supra note 3, at 3.
60. Id. at 3–4.  Additional special requirements may apply in certain contexts, but these are
outside the scope of the present analysis.
61. Id. at 6–7; BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT:
THE STANDARDISED APPROACH TO CREDIT RISK 8 (2001), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbsca04.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2002) [hereinafter BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION: THE STANDARDISED APPROACH TO CREDIT RISK].
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securitizations.  For example, under the standardized approach for
investors, the basic system rests on a rating-based risk weighting
varying between 20% for AAA to AA- and 150% for BB+ to BB-.62
Unrated credits would be assigned a 100% weighting.  Significantly,
lending fully secured by mortgages on residential property, whether
rented or occupied by the owner, continues to be risk weighted at
50%.63  The current proposal suggests that mortgages on commercial
real estate should receive a 100% risk-weighting, subject to certain
specific exceptions or conditions.64  If Basel II proceeds to domestic
implementation, the structure is likely to provide incentives for banks
to securitize both residential mortgages and commercial property
mortgages in order to reduce associated capital charges.  As a result
of the current risk-weighting structure of the Basel II proposals, gov-
ernments around the world are likely to focus increasingly on devel-
oping appropriate legal infrastructure to support mortgage securitiza-
tion.  Further, the reliance on ratings of the Basel II proposals should
encourage the development of ratings agencies and services, espe-
cially in emerging markets, with the requirements of rating agencies
acting as a further incentive to government reforms.  Nonetheless, the
experience in the United States, United Kingdom, and continental
Europe suggests that even with the existence of the necessary sup-
porting elements, market development requires a significant amount
of time, perhaps in the neighborhood of ten years.65
In the final analysis, however, appropriate legal design is not suf-
ficient.  While legal and institutional structures are key for financial
development and stability, neither appropriate laws on the books nor
effective institutions are sufficient in themselves for development.66
62. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: ASSET SECURITISATION, supra note 3, at
6–7.
63. BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION: THE STANDARDISED APPROACH TO
CREDIT RISK, supra note 61, at 8.
64. Id. at 9.
65. According to this analysis, the use of securitization in Hong Kong should increase dra-
matically.  Recent increases in the number and sophistication of transactions suggests that this
may be happening.  Cf. Securitization in Asia: Developments and Outlook, Workshop organ-
ized by the Asian Institute of International Financial Law, Hong Kong University, and the
Global Capital Markets Center, Duke University, held in Hong Kong, (Mar. 13, 2002) (on file
with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law).
66. Pistor, Raiser, and Gelfer sum up the situation well: “In their analysis of law and fi-
nance around the world, [La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny] show that effective
law enforcement is not a substitute for poor laws on the books.  The experience of transition
economies suggests that the reverse is also true: Good laws cannot substitute for weak institu-
tions.”  KATHARINA PISTOR ET AL., LAW AND FINANCE IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES 25 (Euro-
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Rather, both appropriate laws and effective institutions are necessary
to support mortgage securitization in the context of broader financial
development and stability.
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Working Paper No. 48, 2000) (citing Rafael
La Porta et al., Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113, 1113–55 (1998)).
